Obama court hearing to focus on actions of Hawai’i officials, need for disclosure
Obama author Andy Martin heads for historic court hearing in Honolulu. Martin will arrive in Honolulu Friday evening to prepare for a historic court hearing in the Circuit Court Tuesday, November 18th at 10:30 A.M. “Some people want to run up the white flag and kiss Obama’s fanny,” Martin says. “In the words of John Paul Jones, ‘I’ve just begin to fight.’ Unless and until Obama releases records about his past—his birth certificate, college files and similar information—he lacks legitimacy. I do not think any American owes loyalty to Obama’s radical socialist revolution, which is bent on destroying our way of life. Why will Barack Obama not release his original, typewritten 1961 birth certificate?”
[This document has been reformatted for the Internet]
Post Office Box 1851
New York, NY 10150-1851
Toll-free tel.(866) 706-2639
Toll-free fax (866) 707-2639
E-mail (text only):
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAII
LINDA LINGLE, in her
Official capacity as Governor
Of the State of Hawai’i,
DR. CHIYOME FUKINO, in her
official capacity as Director
of the Department of Health,
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF
TO SHOW CAUSE AND
IN OPPOSITION TO
NOTION FILED BY
When this case was filed on October 17, 2008, the status of the document to which Plaintiff was seeking access was one involving intense political curiosity. Today, the underlying principles of this lawsuit have irretrievably morphed: the status of the document sub judice has now become a part of American history. Plaintiff’s right to examine the original 1961, typewritten document—now a crucial record of American history—has become overwhelmingly stronger.
Therefore, for the reasons that follow in this Memorandum, this Court at the hearing on November 18th must apply the legal principles applicable to access to historical documents.
The birth certificate and efforts to
manipulate the birth certificate
A. Barack Hussein Obama (hereinafter “Obama”) was apparently born in Honolulu in August, 1961. He may have been born elsewhere and had his birth registered in Honolulu. We do not know.
B. The State of Hawai’i generated a typewritten Certificate of Live Birth (“COLB”) for Mr. Obama in 1961. There may have also been a separate document issued by the hospital, if he was born in a hospital, certifying to the birth. These documents collectively will be referred to as the “birth certificate.” We know that the 1961 document is in existence because defendant Fukino claimed on October 31st that she had examined the document, see Exhibit A.
C. In June, 2008 Obama released a copy of his COLB to some media, though not all. See Exhibit B. The COLB was purported to be an “original,” although obviously it bears no resemblance to the original, typewritten 1961 document.
In response, some individuals have posted on the Internet copies of their temporally similar COLB’s: they bear no relationship to Exhibit B, see e.g. Exhibit C, furnished to Plaintiff by a civic-minded citizen (original copy available on request). Exhibit C contains considerably more detailed information than Exhibit B (p. 3).
D. The firestorm over where Obama was born, and to whom, continued to grow. After Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking access under both the Hawai’i Public Health Statistics Act as well as the Uniform Information Procedures Act (UIPA”), defendant Fukino apparently ordered retrieval of the 1961 original and claimed to have examined it.
But Fukino went further, soliciting media coverage and expressing opinions about the ultimate facts contained in the document. Fukino also tried to use her professional access to the record to politically attack citizens who had raised legitimate questions about the document, see Exhibit B, p. 1.
E. On November 4, 2008, Obama became President-elect. Whatever prior status the COLB had as a document of intense political interest, a fortiori on November 4th the document passed “into the ages” as a vital, original manuscript of American history.
F. This Court has issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) why Plaintiff should not be granted access to and a copy of the file relating to the original, typewritten 1961 COLB and any related documents from the hospital on which the COLB is based. The Attorney General (“AG”) has filed a cross-motion to dismiss. The court is scheduled to conduct a hearing on all matters on November 18, 2008.
The applicable legal principles in this lawsuit
Plaintiff respectfully submits that there are three overarching principles of law that govern a procedural analysis of this litigation.
The first principle is the well-established doctrine of waiver.
The second principle is the canons of statutory construction that apply to analysis of the claim in this lawsuit.
Finally, since this lawsuit was filed under Hawai’i law, Hawai’i law controls the decision of this Court.
Each issue will be addressed in turn.
The waiver issue
A. The Ashwander doctrine
Hawai’i has adopted the Ashwander doctrine, State v. Lo, 66 haw. 653, 675 P.2d 754, 757 (Haw. 1983) citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring), see also State v. Poaipuni, 98 Haw. 387, 49 P.3rd 353, 367 (Haw. 2002)(Moon, J., concurring). Ashwander provides that a court will decide a case on the narrowest possible grounds necessary to a decision.
In this lawsuit, for example, if the case can be decided on the basis of “waiver,” the Court does not need to resolve statutory questions. If the Court can decide the issues based on statutory construction of the plain language and structure of the statute, legislative intent is unnecessary. If statutory construction is sufficient, the Court need not address constitutional claims.
B. Hawai’i waiver principles
Hawai’i law clearly recognizes the principle of waiver in civil matters, Uncle John’s vs. Mid-Pacific, 71 Haw. 412, 794 P.2d 614, 616-617 (Haw. 1990), Great American v. Aetna Casualty, 76 Haw. 346, 876 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Haw. 1994). The best analysis of the definition of waiver that falls squarely on the convoluted issues of this case, however, is found at Ikeoka v. Kong, 47 Haw. 220, 386 P.2d 855, 870 (Haw. 1963) in a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis:
‘The question of whether or not a given state of facts brings the case within principles of the law of waiver is not always an easy one to determine. In Pabst Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 116, [105 N.W. 563] a statement of the principles which should govern in such cases, and which meets with our approval, is as follows: ‘It would seem that the more satisfactory ground on which to support the doctrine of waiver is that it is a rule of judicial policy, the legal outgrowth of judicial adhorrence, so to speak, of a person’s taking inconsistent positions and gaining advantages thereby through the aid of courts,–a rule by which, regardless [47 Haw. 249] of absence of any element of estoppel or consideration as those terms are popularly understood, the maxim that one shall not be permitted to blow hot, then with advantage to himself turn and blow cold, within limits sanctioned by long experience as required for the due administration of justice, has been prohibitively applied. * * *” Scott v. Pilipo, 25 Haw. 386, 391.
C. Obama’s waiver
Obama delivered a purported “original” copy of his COLB to FactCheck.org, and apparently other Internet media as well, see Exhibit B. Clearly, what Obama claimed was not true. The document he produced was not even remotely a copy of the original, typewritten 1961 paper in Dr. Fukino’s possession. Having (i) released what he claimed was the “original,” and (ii) having been found to have dissembled, Obama has waived any objections to release of the “real” original document.
In the words of Justice Lewis, Obama cannot be allowed to “blow hot” and then use the defendants as a beard to “blow cold.” He claimed his COLB was an “original,” when in fact it was a modern, laser-printed facsimile of official records (an “abstract”) and not even remotely a copy of the 1961 typewritten original. Since Obama has purported to disclose the “original,” he has placed the defendants’ copy of the “actual” original in the public domain for comparative purposes.
The defendants are now estopped from asserting that access should be denied to the 1961 typewritten original when Obama has expressly claimed that he published his “original” on the Internet, see Exhibit B (“FactCheck.org staffers have now seen, touched, examined and photographed the original birth certificate.”)
FactCheck.org’s statement was objectively and verifiably false. The law does not allow such a blatantly fraudulent maneuver to stand: the claim that the laser-printed document was an “original” 1961 document was obviously untrue. FactCheck.org may have been fooled; plaintiff was not (which is why he is respected nationally and internationally as an investigative writer and researcher, see Part V (A), infra).
It is unavoidably clear that Obama has sought to “blow hot” and then “blow cold.” He claimed his COLB was an “original,” when in a fact it was a modern, laser-printed facsimile from official records (an “abstract”) and not even remotely a copy of the 1961 typewritten original. Since Obama has purported to disclose the “original,” he has placed the “actual” original in the public domain for comparative purposes. The defendants are estopped from now asserting that access should be denied to the 1961 typewritten original.
The law does not permit a government agency to be used to shield fraudulent manipulation; the claim that the laser-printed document was an “original” 1961 document was obviously untrue. Obama, having waived access to the “original” by his own admission, the defendants cannot now turn his waiver on its head and say they will deny access to their copy of the original document.
Because his secrecy rights were waived by Obama himself in releasing the document, the defendants have no right to engage in further manipulation and legerdemain to provide political cover for management of the truth. That is not their role and, most egregiously, their actions are a clear misuse of the legislature’s intent in creating a basis for bona fide secrecy, but certainly not manipulative secrecy.
D. Fukino’s waiver
Defendant is a medical doctor and a custodian of health records. She is neither a political battering ram nor an agent of presidential politics. She solicited a role as the former while inserting herself in the latter.
In Justice Lewis’ language, Dr. Fukino can no more
“blow hot” and then “blow cold” than Obama. Exhibit A and other local coverage reflects that Fukino solicited coverage on the last weekend of the presidential election by purporting to express an expert opinion on a document that she refused to make public and where she was not remotely qualified as an expert. The original 1961 COLB may confirm what she claimed, or it may not. It may eliminate questions or it may raise new ones. We simply don’t know.
In a democracy, and under clear principles of Hawai’ian law stated below, we don’t have to take Fukino’s word for what the document is or contains; we have a right to examine the original.
Dr. Fukino cannot make declaratory statements about a public record and then refuse to allow the media to cross-examine her claims by examining the original document that she is discussing. She clearly manifested an attempt to use the statutory secrecy of her office for an improper and unlawful purpose, political manipulation. (Parenthetically, Fukino’s desperate last-minute efforts only confirm the strength and success of Plaintiff’s bona fide efforts to raise concerns about the manipulative actions of Hawai’i officials.)
If Fukino had merely exercised her right to go into the vault and examine the document in question, that would have in no way constituted a waiver. But she far exceeded her statutory duties, solicited massive media attention and interjected herself into political controversy and sought to bolster Obama on the final weekend of the election. That behavior blatantly exceeded both her statutory duties and professional competence, all while seeking to manipulate a document in her possession and control. The law does not allow a public official to so openly manipulate material and information in her possession.
Even if Obama had not already waived access to the material in Fukino’s possession, there is no way anyone can test the accuracy and veracity of Fukino’s unconditional claims without actually seeing the document concerning which she was offering testimony. Entirely and completely independently of Obama’s waiver, Fukino waived the secrecy provisions of the statute by her own conduct or misconduct.
E. Historical waiver
Whatever may have been the analytical principles applicable to determining access to the material in question prior to November 4th, it is clear that on November 4th the status of the documents changed from political records to historical documents. There is no way Hawai’i can justify imposing secrecy on material involving a prominent figure in American history.
No one can legitimately argue that someone is going to engage in identity theft and hold himself or herself out as “Barack Obama,” using and misusing the COLB. That contention is absurd on its face. So what is the basis to persist in concealing a document that has become controversial because of Parts C and D above? None whatsoever.
The statute in question was clearly intended to protect the privacy rights of private citizens, not to prevent access to vital historical material.
The statutory construction issue
A. The AG’s omitted/manipulated statutory language
The AG’s submission to this Court cited the relevant statutory language out of context and sought to turn the broad statutory language in exactly the opposite direction from the express language in the law itself. This legerdemain is unacceptable and should raise the eyebrows of the Court. Any time a public official cites a statute’s language out of context, a question is raised as to “why?”
The critical statutory language of HRS §338-18(b) that the AG omitted from its Motion to Dismiss states:
(b) The department shall not permit inspection of public health statistics records, or issue a certified copy of any such record or part thereof, unless it is satisfied that the applicant has a direct and tangible interest in the record. The following persons shall be considered to have a direct and tangible interest in a public health statistics record:
The statute then goes on to enumerate the list of persons cited by the AG. The AG’s omission of the introductory language to the section cited, when coupled with the AG’s attempts to alter the context of the statutory language, is a serious distortion of the law’s plain language.
Section 338-18(b) merely provides a list of persons who ipso facto are entitled to have a direct interest; by no reasonable reading can this language support the AG’s position that the list following the preamble is exclusive instead of exemplary.
The term “direct and tangible interest,” moreover, is not defined in the statute even though other critical terms are, see HRS §338-1. The omission of a definition of the term “direct and tangible interest,” when considered in the context of 338-1, shows conclusively that the legislature did not intend for the exemplars provided in the statute to be a self-limiting and exclusive list of persons entitled to access.
Indeed, the statute itself provides an open-ended opportunity for access in 18(b)(9) by vesting this Court with untrammeled and unrestrained authority to order access to any person on such terms as the Court considers just and appropriate. No one can reasonably argue that 338-18(b)(9) in any way contains or places any limiting language on the common law and common sense authority of this Court to grant relief pursuant to Subsection (9), see Part V (B), infra.
B. Hawai’i principles of statutory construction
In the absence of a statutory definition for “direct and tangible interest,” the court is left to fashion a definition or interpretation out of common language and common sense (see Part V (B), infra). As the Hawai’i ICA stated in Carlisle v. One (1) Boat, 118 Haw. 107, 185 P.3rd 855, 860 (Haw. ICA 2008):
A. Statutory Interpretation-Civil
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions
of law to be reviewed de novo under the right/wrong
Our statutory construction is guided by the following well established principles:
[When construing a statute,] our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.
In construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.
This court may also consider the reason and spirit of the law, and the cause that induced the legislature to enact it to discover its true meaning.
Lingle v. Hawai‘i Gov’t Employees Ass’n, AFSCME, Local 152, 107 Hawai‘i 178, 183, 111 P.3d 587, 592 (2005) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted) (quoting Guth v. Freeland, 96 Hawai‘i 147, 149-50, 28 P.3d 982, 984-95 (2001) ).
Is the underlying Health Act ambiguous? Plaintiff would argue that it is not. The statute clearly provides a list of persons or entities that are automatically entitled to access, but nowhere does the law state that the list is excusive.
The statute itself contains in Subsection (9), a wide-open grant of jurisdiction to order access to records based on any terms the Court finds just and reasonable. Nowhere is the Court’s power under Subsection (9) limited or confined. Clearly, the legislature was anticipating precisely such a case as this one, where a legitimate author (see Part V (A), infra) and columnist seeks access to what have now become vital records in American history.
Any reasonable construction of the statutory language would yield ineluctably to the conclusion that the legislature has provided broad powers to any court to allow access on terms the court believes are just and reasonable.
The constitutional issues
A. The Plaintiff’s status
Plaintiff is a national and international authority on Obama. He authored the first commentary to raise questions about Obama’s family history, in 2004. He has authored a 400+ page best selling book, see Exhibit D attached hereto, “Obama: The Man Behind The Mask.”
He has been asked to opine about Obama locally, nationally and internationally, on television and radio.
Plaintiff is also very well known because he has dug deeply into Obama’s past and continually produced controversial interpretations of Obama’s heritage and life experiences, particularly in areas where Obama has sought to conceal or occlude his prior associations. Thus, by no means is Plaintiff only a member of the “general public” or someone who has not established both his own and his audience’s specialized interest in Obama.
B. The common law/constitutional right to access
Bona fide members of the media and authors such as Plaintiff enjoy a qualified constitutional and common law right to access vital public records. That general principle applies a fortiori to historical records concerning a President-elect of the United States.
The common law/constitutional right to access vital public records was explicitly set forth in two directly applicable Hawai’i Supreme Court cases, Honolulu Advertiser v. Takao, 59 Haw. 237, 580 P.2d 58 (Haw. 1978)(“Takao”), and Estate of Campbell, 106 haw. 453, 106 P.3rd 1096 (Haw. 2005)(“Campbell”).
A. Because the term “direct and tangible interest” is not defined in the statute, this Court can look to Takao, where the Court stated that “We construe the phrase ‘any party’ to mean any person who seeks the transcript for a legitimate and proper purpose.” 580 P.2d 61. Here, Plaintiff seeks access to the original typewritten 1961 COLB for what are facially “legitimate and proper purposes.”
B. Takao establishes an unequivocal common law right to copy public records, 580 P.2d 61. The common law right is critical because in Campbell the Supreme Court underscored that its decision rested on the common law and did not need to go to the extent of making a constitutional determination, 106 P.3rd 1108 fn. 26:
Additionally, inasmuch as our policy of judicial openness is rooted in the common law, see Takao, 59 Haw. at 239, 580 P.2d at 61 (concluding that the “public does generally have the right, established by the common law, to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records”), we need not reach the issue of whether the right of access is also protected under both the federal and our state constitutions.
C. The Hawai’i Supreme Court decided an issue applicable above, namely how to construe the statute, in Campbell, 106 P.3rd 1101, where the Court stated:
Whether Appellants constitute “interested persons” as defined in HRS § 560:1-201 is a matter of statutory interpretation and therefore a question of law subject to de novo review. Ing v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 76 Hawai’i 266, 874 P.2d 1091 (1994). As oft-stated, “our primary duty [when interpreting statutes] is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language of the statute itself.” Id. at 270, 874 P.2d at 1095. We have also noted on several occasions that “where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.” Id. (citing AIG Hawaii Ins. Co. v. Estate of Caraang, 74 Haw. 620, 634, 851 P.2d 321, 328 (1993)). In this case, the language of the relevant statutes is plain and unambiguous.
Plaintiff submits that the statute sub judice is equally “plain and unambiguous” in (i) placing no limits on the categories of persons entitled to access to records and merely providing an exemplary list of persons who receive automatic a priori access, and (ii) allowing a court to exercise its general jurisdiction concerning access determinations, as provided by Subsection (9). The Supreme Court also noted for purposes of this lawsuit that the general grant of jurisdiction under HRS §603-21.9 could be read in pari materia with Subsection (9) of the Health statute. 106 P.3rd 1107 fn. 21.
While the foregoing decisions did not involve access to a birth certificate, the broad constitutional right of access to public records fully encompasses the historical documents for which access is sought in this case.
The Uniform Information Practices Act
When this case began, Obama was a political figure. Today he is part of American history. Plaintiff would admit that as an abstract matter, it is a general canon of construction that the particular statute should control over the general. Thus, all other factors being equal or normal, HRS §338-18(b) would control over the UIPA, HRS §92F. The AG’s claim in this regard would not be out of line in an ordinary lawsuit.
But this is no longer an ordinary case involving an ordinary citizen. The COLB relates to a President-elect of the United States. HRS §338-18 was intended to apply to the common or garden-variety information of an ordinary private citizen or quasi-private citizen. Obama is no longer a private citizen or quasi-private citizen. He is a part of American history. As such, this Court can properly apply the broader disclosure provisions of the UIPA to the issues presented in this case.
Plaintiff is no longer seeking access to a private person’s personal records: he is seeking access to vital, original, historical documentation concerning the President-elect of the United States.
The Attorney General’s arguments
A. With due respect, the AG has filed a motion to dismiss raising various defenses. The disingenuousness of the AG’s arguments reflects a total lack of awareness of the post-November 4th reality, and bears no relationship to the foregoing principles and cases set forth in this Memorandum. The AG’s arguments will be addressed in turn.
B. The AG’s “standing” issue
1. The two “standing” cases cited by the AG have no relevance to the issues in this lawsuit. Where individuals seek to challenge governmental action, general standing principles apply. Here, an author seeks access to a public record that, on a number of grounds, is presumptively subject to inspection and copying, supra.
2. The cases cited by the AG also make no sense because, as shown in Plaintiff’s prior arguments, the Hawai’i Supreme Court has established “openness” as the standard and empowered the Court to adjudicate disputes concerning access, Campbell, supra. How could someone seeking access under statutes–Subsection (9) and the UIPA having vested courts with jurisdiction to hear disputes–not have standing to seek access through judicial relief? The AG’s standing claims border on nonsense.
C. The AG’s “failure to state a claim” issue
Based on the prior Hawai’i case law which Plaintiff has cited, the AG’s “failure to state a claim” argument is nonsense.
D. The AG’s “no right to obtain a vital record” issue
1. The federal case law cited by the AG is federal law. Plaintiff rests his entire claim on Hawai’i law. The previously cited Hawai’i Supreme Court’s decisions trump federal courts on questions of Hawai’i law and the power of this Court to grant relief.
2. The AG ignores the fact that in balancing the competing interests, Plaintiff is a legitimate author seeking access to a document of immense historical interest.
3. The AG seems to ignore (i) that Obama and Fukino have waived their claims, thereby at a minimum diluting their claims to privacy and (ii) a birth certificate with information 48 years old hardly constitutes “private” information, particularly when the person whose record is being sought has claimed to have already released “the original.”
E. The AG’s service of process issue
The Governor’s office (though not the Governor in person) was personally served with the papers in this lawsuit, as was the AG’s office. The AG trivializes the significance of this lawsuit and the important public issues presented by even raising such a defense. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause (“OSC”), which was issued by the Court, was properly served on the AG and brings the AG before the Court on Plaintiff’s own moving papers.
By asking this Court to permit an expedited piggyback hearing and filing a motion to dismiss on a piggyback basis with Plaintiff’s own hearing, the AG may have waived any claim of lack of service. Otherwise, the AG can respond to the OSC and Plaintiff will object to a hearing on service of process when the time to serve process has not finally expired.
The AG is claiming on the one hand that it wants an expedited hearing for which it has been fully served, while on the other hand objecting to service of process. Does the AG want an expedited hearing with actual notice, or is it going to litigate some form of hypothetical notice that it is claiming?
Plaintiff has requested clarification from the AG as to whether that office is going to pursue that claim in light of the video evidence of service of process.
Finally, the AG’s office has failed to respond to Plaintiff’s UIPA demand, attached hereto as Exhibit E. The Court should draw a very serious adverse inference from the AG’s silence and lack of any response to UIPA, Ramil v. Keller, 68 Haw. 608, 726 P.2d 254 (Haw. 1986); Stender v. Vincent, 92 Haw. 355, 992 P.2d 50 (Haw. 2000). Will there have to be a second round of UIPA litigation? The AG has been silent.
The fact that the AG is reduced to making trivial defenses shows the paucity of substance in the arguments it is presenting in opposition to Plaintiff’s powerful and overwhelming case for access.
As the foregoing facts establish, there has been a blatant attempt to distort, mislead, misrepresent and manipulate a vital record establishing Mr. Obama’s birth. For some reason he does not want the original COLB to see the light of day. Why?
Whatever the Court’s view of the statutory language concerning an ordinary private citizen, those views must now yield to the imperatives of history: the documents being sought now relate to American history and must be disclosed on that basis to media and scholars such as Plaintiff.
The legislature never intended that personal privacy for ordinary citizens could be used to prevent access to vital records of American history.
A reader is left with the unavoidable, nagging question: What does Obama have to hide, that he has put Plaintiff and the American people through a lawsuit to see the original, typewritten 1961 COLB? That question will be answered some day, in some way.
As Plaintiff shows above, this Court has the power to make the disclosure decision now. Most respectfully this Court is asked to do so forthwith. How can a President of the United States establish his legitimacy as a leader when he is hiding original documents about his life and origins? How?
Merely to reflect on the underlying odor of this lawsuit compels the question, “What are they trying to hide?” What? The defendants’ evidence on that question is what authors, researchers, writers and columnists such as the Plaintiff have a constitutional right to examine and answer.
This Court should answer the threshold question by directing prompt disclosure to Plaintiff of the requested materials.
At the end of the day this lawsuit represents a test of and challenge to Hawaii’s state governmental institutions and governing philosophy: is Hawai’i going to recognize and respect its obligations to history, or is the state government going to be run as a private club that conceals what may be unpleasant but what is nevertheless vital historical evidence?
Hawai’i, by an accident of history, has become the repository of what are now crucial historical records concerning the origins of a President. Under any reasonable interpretation of research and inquiry, such historical documents should be available to inspection and copying by the media and recognized writers/researchers such as Plaintiff. The Court should respect these imperatives and tell the defendants to stop stalling and release the records to the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff Pro se
New York, NY
November 13, 2008